Abstract. Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) is a technique for converting the RSA trapdoor permutation into a chosen ciphertext secure system in the random oracle model. OAEP padding can be viewed as two rounds of a Feistel network. We show that for the Rabin and RSA trapdoor functions a much simpler padding scheme is sufficient for chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle model. We show that only one round of a Feistel network is sufficient. The proof of security uses the algebraic properties of the RSA and Rabin functions.
Introduction
In an influential paper Bellare and Rogaway [2] introduced the Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) system. OAEP is most commonly used for strengthening the RSA and Rabin encryption schemes. OAEP is widely deployed and appears in several standards. Shoup [11] recently described a modification to OAEP called OAEP+ that provably converts any trapdoor permutation into a chosen ciphertext secure system in the random oracle model. Shoup also showed that applying OAEP to the RSA permutation with public exponent e = 3 gives a chosen ciphertext secure system in the random oracle model. Fujisaki et al. [8] were able to extend the result and prove that the same holds for the RSA permutation with any RSA public exponent e.
We show that for the RSA and Rabin systems, much simpler padding schemes can be shown to be chosen ciphertext secure in the random oracle model. We introduce two simple padding schemes. The first is called Simple-OAEP, or SAEP for short. The second is called SAEP + . We note that simplifying the padding scheme makes the system easier to describe and easier to implement, and thus is more elegant. Simplifying the padding scheme has little bearing on performance since padding time is negligible compared to public key operations.
We begin by describing SAEP and SAEP + padding (see Figure 1 ). Let M be a message M ∈ {0, 1} m and let r be a random string r ∈ {0, 1} s1 . Let H be a hash function from {0, 1} s1 to {0, 1} m+s0 . Let G be a hash function from {0, 1} m+s1 to {0, 1} s0 . Define the new padding schemes SAEP and SAEP + as follows:
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SAEP(M, r) = ( (M 0
) ⊕ H(r)) r
SAEP + (M, r) = ( (M G(M r) ) ⊕ H(r)) r
These padding schemes are to be used as preprocessing functions with the Rabin or RSA trapdoor functions. To encrypt a message M ∈ {0, 1} m first pick a random r ∈ {0, 1} s1 , compute y = SAEP(M, r), and set C = y 2 mod N or C = y e mod N for some RSA exponent e. Both schemes provide security against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the random oracle model for appropriate values of m, s 0 , s 1 . Let N be an n-bit modulus. We prove the following results for the Rabin and RSA functions: SAEP: Let Rabin-SAEP be the encryption scheme resulting from combining SAEP with the Rabin trapdoor function, f (x) = x 2 mod N (as described in the next section). We show that Rabin-SAEP provides chosen ciphertext security whenever m + s 0 < n/2 and m < n/4. Security is based on the hardness of factoring large RSA composites. The reduction is very efficient. It is based entirely on applying Coppersmith's algorithm [6] to quadratic and quartic polynomials. SAEP works well with the Rabin function, but is hard to use with RSA, as explained in Section 4. SAEP + : Both RSA-SAEP + (for any RSA exponent e) and Rabin-SAEP + can be shown to be chosen ciphertext secure whenever m + s 0 < n/2. The reduction to factoring for Rabin-SAEP + is extremely efficient. The proof is based on Coppersmith's algorithm. For RSA-SAEP + the reduction to breaking RSA is less efficient. Its running time is similar to the running time of the reduction in the proof of security for RSA-OAEP [8] .
SAEP + is more flexible than SAEP in a number of ways. First, SAEP + can be used with both Rabin and RSA (although Rabin is preferred). Second, SAEP + can encrypt messages of longer size. For example, when using a 1024 bit modulus (n = 1024) one often takes s 0 = 128 for proper security. In this case, the maximum message length in SAEP is 256 bits. In SAEP + the maximum length is 384 bits. Note that since a 1024-bit modulus is often used for transporting a 128-bit session-key, both SAEP and SAEP + are adequate for this purpose. In some cases it might be desirable to allow for longer messages to be encrypted with SAEP + . In Section 5 we note that the proof of security for RSA-SAEP + can be extended so that the scheme is secure whenever m + s 0 < n(1 − δ) for any fixed δ > 0. This means M could be almost as long as the modulus. However, the efficiency of the reduction to breaking RSA degrades exponentially in 1 δ . Hence, throughout the paper we stick with δ = 1/2. The extended proof is based on solutions to the Hidden Number Problem [4] modulo a composite.
Both SAEP and SAEP + work best with the Rabin function. The resulting systems are better than their RSA counterparts in all aspects: (1) encryption is slightly faster, (2) the reduction given in the security proof is more efficient, and (3) security relies on the difficulty of factoring rather than the difficulty of inverting the RSA permutation. Comparison of OAEP and SAEP. OAEP, presented by Bellare and Rogaway, and OAEP+, presented by Shoup, both provide chosen ciphertext security for the RSA trapdoor permutation (although OAEP+ has a more efficient security proof). These padding schemes are defined as follows:
where H, G, W are hash functions. Schematically both OAEP and OAEP+ look like two rounds of a Feistel network. Clearly the new padding schemes, SAEP and SAEP + are simpler. These new schemes are only a single round of a Feistel network.
Although the new padding schemes are simpler than OAEP, they are slightly more restrictive. Using OAEP and OAEP+ one can encrypt messages that are almost as long as the modulus. For example, for a 1024-bit modulus it is safe to encrypt messages that are 768-bits long. In contrast, using the same modulus size, SAEP + can only encrypt 384-bit messages. This difference is irrelevant for common applications (e.g. key transport), but is worth pointing out.
Chosen Ciphertext Security
Adaptive chosen ciphertext security is the accepted notion for secure encryption. We have confidence in this notion since it captures a wide range of attacks, and is equivalent to several other useful security notions [7, 3] . We present the definition due to Rackoff and Simon [12] . Define a (t, q D ) chosen ciphertext attack algorithm A as a t-time algorithm that interacts with a challenger as follows: Setup: The challenger generates a public/private key pair. It gives the public key to the attacker A and keeps the private key to itself. Phase I: The attacker A issues decryption queries for various ciphertexts C.
The challenger responds with the decryption of all valid ciphertexts. Challenge: At some point algorithm A outputs two messages M 0 , M 1 . The challenger responds with a ciphertext C * which is the encryption of M b where b is randomly chosen in {0, 1}. Phase II: The attacker A continues to issue decryption requests C, subject to the constraint C = C * . Finally algorithm A terminates and outputs b ∈ {0, 1}. We say that the attacker is successful if b = b . During the attack the attacker is allowed to make at most q D decryption queries. We define the adversary's advantage as:
We say that a system is (t, , q D ) secure if no (t, q D ) attacker has advantage more than .
Random oracles:
To analyze the security of certain natural constructions Bellare and Rogaway introduced an idealized world called the random oracle model [1] . A system that has chosen ciphertext security in this idealized world is said to be chosen ciphertext secure in the random oracle model. Security in the random oracle model does not imply security in the real world [5] . Nevertheless, the random oracle model is a useful tool for validating natural constructions. Given an encryption scheme using hash functions H 1 , . . . , H n we use (t, q D , q H1 , . . . , q Hn ) to denote a (t, q D ) chosen ciphertext attacker that makes at most q Hi queries to the hash function H i .
Coppersmith's Algorithm
The proofs of security for SAEP and SAEP + are based on an important result due to Coppersmith [6] . Coppersmith proved the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Coppersmith). Let N be an integer and let
We denote by T C (N, d) the running time of Coppersmith's algorithm when finding roots of a polynomial f ∈ Z[x] of degree d. In our proofs we only apply Coppersmith's algorithm to quadratic and quartic polynomials.
Full Description of SAEP and SAEP
+
We now give a full description of the SAEP and SAEP + systems for RSA and Rabin. We first describe these schemes as they apply to the Rabin function.
In doing so we deal with complications that arise from the fact that f (x) = x 2 mod N is not a permutation of Z * N . Let m, s 0 , s 1 be security parameters. Set n = m + s 0 + s 1 . We will make use of a hash function H : {0,
m+s0 . The Rabin-SAEP system is composed of three algorithms: key-gen, encrypt, decrypt. We describe each of these algorithms in turn:
key-gen: The key generation algorithm takes a security parameter n and produces an (n + 2)-bit RSA modulus N = pq where p and q are (n/2 + 1)-bit primes. We require that p = q = 3 mod 4. We also require that N ∈ [2 n+1 , 2 n+1 + 2 n ), i.e. that the two most significant bits of N are '10'. Any of the standardized methods can be used to generate p and q [9] . The public key is N . The private key is the factorization of N , namely p, q . encrypt: We wish to encrypt a message M ∈ {0, 1} m :
Step 1: Pick a random r ∈ {0, 1} s1 .
Step 2: Set t = 0 s0 .
Step 5: Set y = x r ∈ {0, 1} n . We view y as an n-bit integer. Note that y < N/2.
Step 6: Define the ciphertext C as C = y 2 mod N . decrypt: Given a ciphertext C ∈ Z N we decrypt using the steps below. We let A and B be the Chinese Remainder coefficients, i.e. A is 1 mod p and 0 mod q, and B is 0 mod p and 1 mod q.
Step 1:
mod q. Since p = q = 3 mod 4 it follows that z p , z q are square roots of C in Z p , Z q respectively.
Step 2: Test that z 2 p = C mod p and z 2 q = C mod q. If either condition does not hold, then C is not a quadratic residue in Z N . Reject this C as an invalid ciphertext.
Step 3: Set Step 8: Let i ∈ {1, 2} be the unique i for which the condition of Step 7 holds.
Output M i as the decryption of C.
Note that in Step 7, if both t 1 and t 2 are equal to 0 s0 the decryptor cannot choose between them. Hence, in this case the ciphertext is rejected. This means that with very low probability, namely 2 −s0 , a valid ciphertext might be rejected by the decryptor (recall that typically s 0 ≥ 128). For most applications such low error probabilities can be ignored. One concern is whether a malicious encryptor can create a valid ciphertext that will be rejected by the decryptor in Step 7. It is easy to show that in the random oracle model the encryptor would have to spend expected time O (2 s0 ) to create such a ciphertext. This is sufficient for most applications. We note that if a negligible error probability is unacceptable then the encryptor could keep choosing random r's until y has Jacobi symbol 1. This enables the decryptor to select the correct square root by choosing the unique root y i ∈ [0, 2 n ) with Jacobi symbol 1. However, this is unnecessary and makes the scheme less efficient.
During decryption invalid ciphertexts can be rejected in Steps 2 and 3 as well as in Step 7. Manger [10] points out the importance of preventing an attacker from distinguishing between rejections at the various steps, say, using timing analysis. Implementors must ensure that the reason a ciphertext is rejected is hidden from the outside world. Indeed, our proof of security fails if this is not the case.
Description of Rabin-SAEP
+ : The description of Rabin-SAEP + is very similar to Rabin-SAEP. SAEP + makes use of an additional hash function G :
. Key generation for Rabin-SAEP + is identical to key generation for Rabin-SAEP. Encryption differs only in Step 2 where t is defined as
s0 . Decryption differs only in
Step 7 where the condition tested is whether t i is equal to G(M i , r i ).
The description of RSA-SAEP + is analogous to the one given above. Decryption is a bit simpler since one does not have to worry about multiple preimages to the RSA trapdoor permutation.
Complexity Assumptions
Throughout the paper we use the following standard complexity assumptions: Factoring assumption: We say that a t-time algorithm B is an (n, t) factoring algorithm with advantage if B succeeds with probability at least in factoring n-bit integers generated by the key-gen algorithm. The probability is over the random bits used by algorithms key-gen and B. We write adv(B) = . We say that the (n, t, ) factoring assumption holds if there is no (n, t) factoring algorithm with advantage . RSA assumption: We say that a t-time algorithm B is an (n, e, t) algorithm for computing e'th roots in Z N with advantage if B succeeds with probability at least in computing x 1/e mod N for an n-bit integer N generated by the key-gen algorithm and a random x ∈ Z N . The probability is over x and the random bits used by algorithms key-gen, B. We write adv(B) = . We say that the (n, e, t, ) RSA assumption holds if there is no (n, e, t) algorithm with advantage .
Two Simple Facts
We state two simple facts that will be useful in the proof of security.
Fact 2.
Let N = pq be an n + 2-bit integer generated by the key-gen algorithm,
Then with probability at least 1/3 (over the choice of α) there exist two distinct integers y *
we know that C * = α 2 mod N always has either one or two square roots in [0, 2 n ). Let A be the number of α ∈ [0, 2 n ) so that α 2 mod N has one root in [0, 2 n ). Let B be the number of α ∈ [0, 2 n ) so that α 2 mod N has two roots in [0, 2 n ). We know A + B = 2 n . Furthermore, we know that for every α ∈ [0, 2 n ) relatively prime to N we have that α 2 mod N has exactly two roots in [0, N/2). The number of α not relatively prime to N is at most p + q. Therefore,
We get that:
Fact 3. Let N = pq be an n + 2-bit integer generated by the key-gen algorithm. Let α be a random integer in [0, 2 n ) and set
The proof of Fact 3 is immediate.
Proof of Security of Rabin-SAEP
We show that an attacker capable of mounting a successful adaptive chosen ciphertext attack on Rabin-SAEP in the random oracle model can be used to efficiently factor large integers. We use m, s 0 , s 1 as the security parameters of SAEP and set n = m + s 0 + s 1 . Recall that the SAEP key-gen algorithm generates an (n + 2)-bit modulus N .
Theorem 4.
Let N = pq be an integer generated by the Rabin-SAEP key-gen algorithm given the security parameter n. We assume m < n/4 and m+s 0 < n/2. 
Proof of Theorem 4. Let N be an (n + 2)-bit integer generated by the keygen algorithm. To factor N algorithm B begins by picking a random α ∈ [0, 2 n ) and computing C * = α 2 mod N . We show an algorithm that takes C * as input, interacts with A, and outputs a square root α ∈ [0, 2 n ) of C * mod N with probability at least =
). By Fact 2 we know that C * has two distinct square roots γ, γ ∈ [0, 2 n ) with probability at least 1/3. Therefore, α = α with probability 1/6. When this happens, we can factor N by computing gcd(N, α − α ). Since both 0 ≤ α, α < N/2 this is guaranteed to give a non-trivial factor of N . Overall, we succeed in factoring N with probability at least 1 6 as required. The rest of the proof focuses on computing a square root α of C * . We construct a simulator that given C * interacts with algorithm A and produces a root. The simulator responds to A's decryption queries and H hash queries, and provides algorithm A with the challenge ciphertext. We first give a high level description of the simulator (the simulator is described in detail below). The simulator gives C * as the challenge ciphertext to the attacker A. 
i is a square root of C * as required. Next, we give a high level description of how the simulator responds to A's decryption queries. Suppose the attacker issues a decryption query for the ciphertext C. Let C = y 2 mod N for some y ∈ [0, 2 n ) and let r be the s 1 least significant bits of y. We will show that if C is a valid ciphertext, then H(r) must already be defined (otherwise, with high probability, the string 0 s0 will not be found when unpadding y). Hence, the r used to create C must satisfy one of the following: (1) the attacker queried H(r) prior to issuing the decryption query, or (2) r = r * 1 or r = r * 2 . Suppose method (1) is used. Then when the decryption query is issued, the simulator already has r, which enables it to find the square root of C, as above. Suppose method (2) is used, i.e. r = r * i for some i ∈ {1, 2}. In this case, assuming C is a valid ciphertext, we know that y = y * i + 2 s0+s1 ∆ for some |∆| < 2 m < N 1/4 . Hence, define the two polynomials:
i , ∆) = 0 mod N . Therefore, ∆ must be a root of the resultant h = Res z (f, g) which is a quartic polynomial in ∆. Since |∆| < N 1/4 we can use Coppersmith's algorithm to find ∆. Using ∆ the simulator easily finds y * i which is a square root of C * as required. Hence, decryption queries for valid ciphertexts are either correctly answered or they lead directly to a square root of C * . We are now ready to describe the complete simulator for computing square roots. It works as follows: 
m where it wishes to be challenged. The simulator responds with C * as the challenge ciphertext. Decryption queries: Let C ∈ Z N be a ciphertext output by A. The simulator must decrypt C or reject it as an invalid ciphertext. We construct a plaintext extractor to decrypt C. The plaintext extractor takes C, H list , C * as input and works as follows:
Step 1: For each tuple r, H(r) on the H list consider the polynomial f r (X) = (2 s1 x + r) 2 − C. The simulator runs Coppersmith's algorithm on each f r (x) to try to find an |x 0 | < √ N satisfying f r (x 0 ) = 0 mod N . Suppose an x 0 is found for some r 0 on the H list . In this case, the simulator found a square root of C, namely 2 s1 x 0 + r 0 . Using H(r 0 ) from the H list the simulator checks that x 0 is a properly padded SAEP message. If so, it gives A the plaintext. If not, the simulator rejects C as an invalid ciphertext.
Step 2: Suppose no r 0 on the H list is found. Consider the two polynomials
Let h(∆) be the resultant of the two polynomials with respect to z. Then h(∆) is a quartic polynomial. Use Coppersmith's algorithm to try to find a ∆ 0 < 2 m < N 1/4 such that h(∆ 0 ) = 0 mod N . If such a ∆ 0 is found then we know f (y * ) = g(y * , ∆ 0 ) = 0 mod N where y * is some square root of C * . Then the simulator can easily find y * by computing the gcd of the univariate polynomials f (z) and g(z, ∆ 0 ). Since these two monic quadratic polynomials must be different (since C = C * ) their gcd must be a linear polynomial having y * as a root. The simulator outputs y * as the square root of C * and terminates the simulation.
Step 3: If both Step 1 and Step 2 fail to resolve the decryption query, the ciphertext C is rejected as an invalid ciphertext. Note that Step 2 is only done in Phase 2 of the attack. 2 ) are independent of A's view). Hence, since adv(A) ≥ , it follows that in the real attack A must make an r * query with probability at least , i.e. Pr real [A(r * )] ≥ . Next, we show that with high probability A cannot distinguish the real attack from the simulation until it issues an r * query. We say that the event GoodSim occurred if the following two events happen: -The simulator never rejects a valid decryption query issued by A (the validity of a query is determined relative to the oracle H at the end of the simulation), and -During phase I of the attack (i.e. prior to being given the challenge) algorithm A did not issue a decryption query for C where C = y 2 mod N and the s 1 least significant bits of y ∈ [0, 2 n ) are equal to r * 1 or r * 2 . We show that when GoodSim occurs the simulation and the real attack are indistinguishable. We then show that GoodSim occurs with high probability. Claim 1: Pr real [A(r * )] = Pr sim [A(r * )|GoodSim]. Proof: We show that when GoodSim occurs A's view during the simulation is sampled from the same distribution as A's view during the real attack. By construction, all responses to H queries are as in a real attack. Similarly, when GoodSim occurs all responses to decryption queries are as in a real attack. Hence, the only thing to show is that the challenge C * given by the simulator is sampled from the same distribution as in a real attack. Recall that C * is generated by picking a random α ∈ [0, 2 n ) and computing C * = α 2 mod N . For C * to be an encryption of M 0 or M 1 we must introduce an implicit constraint on H, namely H(r * ) = w * for some r * , w * . We show that w * is uniform in {0, 1} m+s0 and that w * , H(r * ) are both independent of the attacker's view at the end of phase I. Hence, setting H(r * ) = w * is consistent with a real attack. Proving this requires some care for the Rabin function.
Let c ∈ {1, 2} be a random bit. If C * has two square roots in [0, 2 n ) we use the bit c to pick one of them at random. Let y * be the chosen square root (unknown to the simulator). By Fact 3 we know that y * is uniform in {0, 1} n (over the probability space induced by α, c s0 . Since C failed to satisfy the condition of Step 1 we know that A has not yet issued a query for H(r 1 ) or H(r 2 ). Since C failed to satisfy Step 2 we know that r 1 , r 2 = r * 1 and r 1 , r 2 = r * 2 . Hence, H(r 1 ) and H(r 2 ) are independent of the attacker's current view. Therefore, the probability that t 1 = 0 s0 or t 2 = 0 s0 is at most 2/2 s0 . Since the attacker makes at most q D queries, the probability that any of these queries are incorrectly rejected is at most 2q D /2 s0 .
To bound the probability for the second part of GoodSim observe that during phase I the challenge C * is independent of the attacker's view. Therefore, the probability that a decryption query during phase I happened to use r * 1 or r * 2 is at most 2/2 s1 . Therefore, the probability that any of the queries during phase I use r * 1 or r * 2 is at most 2q D /2 s1 . To conclude we have that Pr
as required. This completes the proof of Claim 2.
The proof of the lemma now follows from Claims 1 and 2:
As required. This concludes the proof of Lemma 1 and Theorem 4.
Extensions. SAEP is not known to be secure for the general RSA trapdoor permutation, f (x) = x e mod N . For very small RSA exponents one can show some limited security. For example, for e = 3 SAEP has chosen ciphertext security whenever m + s 0 < n/3 and m < n/9. For typical RSA modulus sizes, these restrictions on the message length make it difficult to use this system.
Proof of Security for RSA-SAEP
+ and Rabin-SAEP + The proof of security for SAEP + holds in a more general settings than the proof of SAEP. As in the previous section, we use m, s 0 , s 1 as the security parameters of SAEP + and set n = m + s 0 + s 1 . Let f (x, r) be a trapdoor permutation acting on strings in {0, 1} m+s0 × {0, 1}
s1 . As usual we assume f is selected from a family F of such trapdoor permutations. Following the notation of [8] we define the set partial one-wayness problem as follows: Set partial one-wayness: We say that an algorithm A solves the (f, k) partial one-wayness problem if given f (x, r) the algorithm produces a set S = {r 1 , . . . , r k } ⊆ {0, 1} s1 such that r ∈ S. More precisely, we say that A has advantage if
Consider the f −SAEP + cryptosystem obtained by padding the message M with SAEP + prior to encrypting with f . We first show that a successful chosen ciphertext attacker on f −SAEP + can be used to solve the set partial one-wayness problem for f . We then discuss the applications to the RSA and Rabin functions. A be a (t, q D , 
Theorem 5. Let
Proof. Algorithm B is given C * = f (x * , r * ) for some random x * r * ∈ {0, 1} n . Our goal is to output a list of size q H containing r * . We construct a simulator that interacts with algorithm A and produces the required output. Note that since f is a permutation, x * r * is unique given C * . We first give a high level description of the simulator. During the simulation, A outputs two plaintexts M 0 , M 1 where it wishes to be challenged. The simulator responds with C * as the challenge ciphertext. We view C * as the encryption of M * , where M * is one of the two challenge plaintexts M 0 , M 1 . We will show that if A is to have any information about the decryption of C * it must query the function H at the point r * . Therefore, if we place all of A's queries to H in a list, called the H list , then with non-negligible probability the H list is a solution to the set partial one-wayness problem.
Next, we show how to respond to decryption queries. Say the attacker wishes to decrypt the ciphertext C. Suppose C is a valid ciphertext, and is the encryption of some message M . Furthermore, let C = f (x, r). We will show that if C is a valid ciphertext, then both G(M, r) and H(r) are already defined. Hence, the r used to create C must satisfy one of the following: (1) the attacker queried G(M, r) and H(r) prior to issuing the decryption query, or (2) r = r * and M = M * . Suppose method (1) is used. Then when the decryption query is issued, the simulator has already been queried on G (M, r) . Hence, to decrypt C the simulator simply checks to see which pair M, r on the list of queries to G is the decryption of C. Suppose method (2) is used, i.e. r = r * and M = M * . In this case C = C * and hence this is an invalid decryption query since it matches the challenge ciphertext. Consequently, all decryption queries can be correctly answered. We now give the detailed description of the simulator B. 
Proof As in the proof of Lemma 1 we have that in the real attack Pr real [r * ∈ H list ] ≥ . It remains to show that with high probability A cannot distinguish the simulation from the real attack until it issues a query for H(r * ) or G(−, r * ). Let GoodSim be the event defined as in the proof of Lemma 1, namely we say that the event GoodSim occurred if the following two events happen: -The simulator never rejects a valid decryption query issued by A (the validity of a query is determined relative to the oracle H at the end of the simulation), and -During phase I of the attack (i.e. prior to being given the challenge) algorithm A did not issue a decryption query for C where C = f (x, r * ) for some x ∈ {0, 1} m+s0 . Proof: Let C be a decryption query issued by the attacker and rejected by the simulator. Let C = f (x, r), and let M, t, v be the unpadding of x r as described in Section 2. Then C is a valid ciphertext only if t = G(M, r). Since C is rejected by the simulator we know that the attacker did not issue a query for G (M, r) . Similarly, since C = C * we know that M, r is not equal to M b , r * . Hence, G(M, r) is independent of the attacker's current view. Therefore, the probability that t = G(M, r) is 1/2 s0 . Since the attacker makes at most q D queries, the probability that any decryption query is incorrectly rejected is at most q D /2 s0 . We bound the probability for the second part of GoodSim as we did in the proof of Claim 2 of Lemma 1. Overall, we get that Pr[GoodSim]
as required. This concludes the proof of Claim 2. The proof of the lemma now follows from Claims 1 and 2 as in the calculation at the end of Lemma 1. This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.
We now describe how Theorem 5 applies to the Rabin and RSA functions. For the Rabin function we obtain an extremely efficient reduction to factoring. For the RSA permutation we obtain a reduction to breaking RSA, but the reduction is not as efficient. Since the Rabin function is not a permutation on Z * N one needs to extend the proof of Theorem 5 to this case. The extension is done using the same techniques as in Theorem 4. Theorem 5 remains unchanged. where T C = T C (n, 2).
Proof Suppose A is a (t , q D , q H , q G ) chosen ciphertext attacker on Rabin-SAEP + with advantage . Let f N be the function f N (x) = x 2 mod N for some N generated by the Rabin-SAEP + key-gen algorithm. By Theorem 5 there exists a t 0 -time algorithm B that solves the (f N , q H ) set partial one-wayness problem with advantage 0 for some t 0 , 0 .
We construct an algorithm C for factoring N . The algorithm starts by picking a random α ∈ [0, 2 n ) and computing C * = α 2 mod N . It then runs B on input C * . With probability at least 0 we obtain a set S = {r 1 , . . . , r q H } ⊆ {0, 1} s1 of size q H with the following property: there exists an integer x ∈ [0, 2 m+s0 ) and r ∈ S such that (2 s1 x + r) 2 = C * mod N . Since x < √ N we can then find x, r by running Coppersmith's algorithm on all q H candidates for r. Once x, r are found, we obtain a square root α ∈ [0, 2 n ) of C * mod N . Then the factorization of N is revealed with probability at least 1/6 by computing gcd(N, α − α ). To see this observe that by Fact 2, C * mod N has two square roots in [0, 2 n ) with probability at least 1/3. Therefore, α = α with probability 1/6. Since 0 ≤ α, α < N/2 the GCD gives a non-trivial factor of N . The resulting factoring algorithm C has running time: time(C) = t 0 + q H T C = t + O(q D + q G + q H T C ) and success probability at least adv(C) = purposes one is most likely to use SAEP + rather than SAEP. Nevertheless, it is useful to know that Rabin-SAEP, which is a slightly simpler construction, also provides chosen ciphertext security when appropriate parameters are used.
